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LAYERING, CONVERSION, AND DRIFTING: A 




The design of a country’s consumer insolvency system involves innu-
merable policy choices that broadly reflect the social and economic context 
in which the legislation has been introduced.1 Differences among countries 
can be observed and compared across many different but interrelated met-
rics, including substance,2 rates of usage,3 and decisions regarding imple-
mentation.4
Differences in substance are in some ways easiest to discern and meas-
ure. For example, a country must decide whether to make a discharge avail-
able, and if so, whether its availability should be limited to certain debtors or 
dependent on a showing of a diligent effort to pay.5 Likewise, a country must 
decide whether to impose broad constraints on the system, such as exempting 
* Lecturer and Honorary Fellow at the Institute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin School of 
Law. An early draft of this paper was presented as part of the panel on Emerging Issues in Comparative 
Consumer Insolvency. The author wishes to thank symposium organizers Adrian Walters and Christoph 
Henkel, as well as panel moderator Jason Kilborn, and fellow panelists Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Pablo Ian-
nello, and Simin Gao for a lively exchange. Thanks as well to Bill Whitford and R. Gabriel Dor for helpful 
suggestions.
1. See Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (“Insolvency 
systems profoundly reflect the legal, historical, political, and cultural context of the countries that have 
developed them.”).
2. See, e.g., JACOB S. ZIEGEL, COMPARATIVE CONSUMER INSOLVENCY REGIMES—A CANADIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 9 (2003) (identifying the various substantive metrics for his comparative study of consumer 
insolvency laws, including debtor exemptions, payment of past and future wages, conditions for a dis-
charge, and prerequisites for entering insolvency proceedings).
3. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Nation-Level Bankruptcy Filing Rates, in
CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 225,
227 (Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009).
4. See, e.g., Iain Ramsay, Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 263–64
(linking the economic incentives created for lawyers and private professionals to increased rates of filing).
5. See, e.g., Jason Kilborn, Two Decades, Three Key Questions, and Evolving Answers in Euro-
pean Consumer Insolvency Law: Responsibility, Discretion, and Sacrifice, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT 
AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 307, 315 (ex-
plaining that European insolvency laws have historically “arranged themselves on a continuum” between 
narrow relief that only allows debt modification and broader relief that may include a discharge).
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certain debtor assets from liquidation or excepting certain debts from dis-
charge.6
Rates of usage are also fairly easy to measure, though complicated by 
the fact that several systems offer multiple options for consumers.7 A coun-
try’s optimal degree of usage directly influences design choices.8 Countries 
that seek to expand the rates of use may make design choices that streamline 
the process or make it more desirable for consumers.9 On the other hand, a 
system that is too popular may disrupt the fragile balance between creditors 
and debtors and may be scaled back to make it less desirable for consumers.10
The third metric, implementation, is the most challenging for compara-
tive insolvency scholars to evaluate. On the surface, differences in imple-
mentation are deceptively easy to observe and measure. For example, it is 
quite simple to divide countries between those that rely on a court-based sys-
tem11 versus those that employ a more administrative system.12 However, in 
some ways, these implementation differences are merely superficial and 
mask more difficult questions that connect closely to design choices. For ex-
ample, the design of an insolvency system also requires choices regarding 
6. See, e.g., ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 9 (identifying the many decisions a country must make about 
the nature and scope of its discharge).
7. See, e.g., Ramsay, supra note 4, at 260–62 (arguing that statistics regarding usage can be mis-
leading if they don’t adequately account for all mechanisms a country offers for addressing overindebt-
edness). In addition, Professor Ramsay argues that the raw data do not tell the full story, because some 
countries’ insolvency systems are designed for use primarily by middle class debtors (e.g., the U.S. and 
Japan), while others are designed to provide relief for lower income debtors (e.g., Canada and the United 
Kingdom). Id. at 261–62.
8. See, e.g., Johanna Niemi, Overindebted Households and Law: Prevention and Rehabilitation 
in Europe, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 91, 102–03 (explaining that many countries have imposed disincentives 
to filing bankruptcy which may reflect cultural attitudes toward debt but may also create unnecessary 
hurdles for consumers who need debt relief); see also Mann, supra note 3, at 227 (explaining that rising 
levels of insolvency internationally have triggered numerous debates about the optimal level of usage by 
consumers). Professor Mann further notes that, like most programs that have a social welfare component, 
legislators have a long tradition of designing the program in ways that stigmatize its use. Id. at 230.
9. See Mann, supra note 3, at 227 (noting that the United Kingdom and Japan have both introduced 
recent reforms to better incentivize consumer use). However, Mann questions whether economic incen-
tives are sufficient to overcome cultural barriers. See id. at 228–31.
10. See id. at 227 (noting that the United States responded to rising numbers of consumer filings 
by limiting access).
11. The United States is a prominent example of a court-based system. See Angela Littwin, The
Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for its Surprising 
Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1938–39 (2011) (noting that the court system used by the United 
States stands in contrast to its main social welfare programs, which are handled administratively).
12. France is a prominent example of a system that is largely administrative, with limited court 
involvement. See, e.g., Jason J. Kilborn, La Responsabilisation de L’Economie: What the United States 
Can Learn from the New French Law on Consumer Overindebtedness, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 619, 635–45
(2005) (describing the prominent role that France’s regional commissions play in implementing consumer 
insolvency law as compared to the more limited role of courts).
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the degree of predictability and uniformity in applying its substantive provi-
sions.13 Should a country implement its policy choices via bright-line rules? 
Or should a country use more flexible standards and allow the system to dis-
pense justice in individual cases? Such choices are key to implementation 
but are not always easy to measure in ways that allow meaningful compari-
sons among countries.
Another deceptively simple basis for comparison is to distinguish those 
countries whose systems are designed for use by private practitioners (such 
as the United States,14 Scotland,15 and Japan,16 which rely on lawyers, or 
Canada,17 which relies on accounting professionals) and those systems in 
which debtors do not need private representation, such as Germany,18
France,19 and the Netherlands.20 However, this distinction may be mislead-
ing, because many of the countries in which private professionals are unnec-
essary rely instead on public or not-for-profit institutions that play a powerful 
gatekeeping role that is equal to, if not more entrenched than, that of private 
professionals.21
Because of the deeper layers of analysis that arise with implementation 
questions, the differences among various countries’ institutional frameworks 
for implementation are arguably the most complicated to evaluate.22 Yet it is 
a critical inquiry to understanding design choices. This is because many in-
solvency systems are designed either with input from, or in reaction to, the 
professionals and institutions tasked with implementation.23
13. For example, the Netherlands and France have both shifted from a discretionary system to more 
bureaucratic bright line rules. See infra Section I.A.
14. See infra Section I.B.2.
15. See infra Section I.B.1.
16. See infra Section I.C.2.
17. See generally ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 28–30, 155–56 (describing the critical role of the trustee, 
who is a private professional hired and paid by the debtor).
18. See infra Section I.C.1.
19. See infra Section I.A.1.
20. See infra Section I.A.2.
21. See Iain Ramsay, U.S. Exceptionalism, Historical Institutionalism, and the Comparative Study 
of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 947, 953 (2015) (explaining that a central notion of path 
dependency is that once institutions are given central responsibility for implementing policy, the opera-
tion of these institutions becomes more significant than the initial design choices).
22. See id. at 951 (“A salient characteristic of consumer insolvency institutions is that they rarely 
emerge fully formed but often develop over time and may involve a process of conversion of existing 
institutions. . . . Identifying and explaining change in bankruptcy law are not simple tasks.”).
23. See, e.g., Ramsay, supra note 4, at 264 (noting that professionals may have a “disproportionate 
influence on the structure and substance of” insolvency law due to its “technical nature”); see also id. at
271 (concluding that “[p]ro-debtor laws in a country may . . . be a side wind” of the professionals tasked 
with implementing the laws).
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In a recent article, Professor Iain Ramsay proposed using the lens of 
historical institutionalism, which focuses on the mechanisms of legal stabil-
ity and change, to examine consumer insolvency systems.24 Professor Ram-
say shows that the tools of historical institutionalism yield valuable insights 
about the law in action and the institutional forces that shape legal change.25
In particular, the concept of path dependency offers a useful framework for 
analyzing consumer insolvency systems.26 Path dependency starts from the 
proposition that, in the absence of some motivating force for change, policies 
will remain stable.27 Changes occur at “critical junctures,” when circum-
stances create opportunities for reform.28
Importantly, historical institutionalism recognizes that the changes that 
yield the most useful insights are not always dramatic changes.29 For exam-
ple, there may be periods when there is little appetite for political change, 
and other moments when the political costs of major change may be too 
high.30 Instead, many smaller changes occur more subtly through the pro-
cesses of layering, conversion, or drifting.31 Layering occurs when rules or 
policies are added to an existing legal framework.32 Conversion occurs when 
institutional actors take advantage of opportunities to exploit ambiguities in 
the existing legal framework.33 Drifting occurs when an unaddressed gap 
emerges between design and implementation.34 Importantly, drifting can be 
the result of legislative inadvertence or an intentional design feature.35 Pro-
fessor Ramsay argues that these three categories can bring new lucidity to 
comparative studies of consumer insolvency systems.36 As an example, he 
offers a comprehensive overview of the English insolvency system through 
the lens of drifting and conversion.37
24. Ramsay, supra note 21, at 948, 952. Professor Ramsay has since incorporated these ideas into 
a broader comparative study of the United States, England and Wales, France, and Sweden. See IAIN 
RAMSAY, PERSONAL INSOLVENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE US AND 
EUROPE 14–15 (2017).
25. Ramsay, supra note 21, at 948–52.
26. Id. at 954–55.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 955. For consumer insolvency, the changes that create reform opportunities include major 
political shifts, economic downturns, or puzzles arising from unexpected rates of usage. Id.
29. Id. at 955–56.
30. Id. at 956.
31. Id. at 955–57.
32. Id. at 956.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 955–56.
35. Id. at 956.
36. Id. at 955–56.
37. Id. at 965–72.
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Drawing in part on the framework proposed by Professor Ramsay, this 
Article identifies and examines changes in the consumer insolvency systems 
in seven different countries. The analysis does not purport to be a complete 
explanation of the economic, cultural, and political forces contributing to the 
change or stability of each system. Instead, the analysis is narrow and focuses 
on three questions. First, to what extent did the professionals or institutions 
tasked with implementing the systems play a role in motivating those 
changes? Second, are the changes on balance pro-consumer or anti-con-
sumer? Third, to what extent does the general legal climate of a particular 
country influence the design and implementation of each system?
Importantly, this Article remains neutral on the many questions sur-
rounding the optimal design and use of particular systems, and instead fo-
cuses on questions relating to the path-dependence of the recent changes that 
can be observed in each system.38 Accordingly, this Article starts from the 
premise that each country has valid cultural and economic reasons for its 
initial choices regarding the design and use of its insolvency system.39 By 
starting from this premise and then looking at the shifts that each system has 
undergone over time, we can see a trajectory that sheds light on the degree 
to which the implementation of the system may have either strayed from 
these initial choices, or created outcomes that raise questions about the wis-
dom of these initial choices. We can then try to connect these trajectories to 
the professionals and institutions that are tasked with implementation.
Having identified these path dependent trajectories, we can then use ex-
isting metrics to evaluate the trends in order to determine how the presence 
or absence of institutional change agents may be reshaping the law. One 
common metric for evaluation in comparative consumer insolvency is 
whether an insolvency system is pro-consumer or anti-consumer. These la-
bels capture scholars’ sense of whether an insolvency system offers mean-
ingful relief to consumers. But, as others have argued, these labels are 
necessarily reductive and cannot convey the degree to which the availability 
of meaningful relief is influenced by cultural attitudes toward debt or other 
political obstacles.40 Nonetheless, evaluating whether the trends are pro-con-
sumer or anti-consumer can yield valuable insights about how institutional 
38. See Ramsay, supra note 4, at 258 (encouraging comparative consumer insolvency scholars to 
move beyond descriptions and noting trends and instead made broader and more generalized inquiries 
into the institutional forces that shape insolvency laws in various countries).
39. See id. at 256 (“[B]ankruptcy law is at the crossroads of important values—the legal and social 
norm that debts should be repaid and the value of a safety net for individuals who have miscalculated 
risks or suffered from an important change of circumstances.”).
40. See, e.g., Iain Ramsay, Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in 
Canada, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 379, 379 (2003) (noting that asking whether a system is “‘creditor-friendly’
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change agents may be reshaping insolvency systems in ways that could not 
be accomplished solely through the political process.
Another common metric for evaluation is whether a country’s bank-
ruptcy system is “efficient.” However, “efficiency” can be measured from 
many different perspectives and may often be in the eye of the beholder. One 
narrower approach to assessing a system’s efficiency uses the concept of ra-
tional sorting.41 Professor Jean Braucher describes rational sorting as “a prin-
ciple to reconcile to the greatest extent possible . . . three goals . . . creditor 
repayment at lowest administrative cost, debtor discharge and treatment.”42
Many insolvency systems engage in “sorting” in that they are designed to 
channel debtors into different options based on their repayment abilities. 
However, irrational sorting occurs when debtors with different repayment 
abilities are sorted into the same channels.43 On the other hand, even if the 
system properly sorts consumers into appropriate channels, the system may 
be inefficient if the administrative costs or delays created by the sorting 
mechanism exceed the benefit to creditors. The various insolvency systems 
are all over the map, literally and figuratively, when it comes to the sorting 
mechanisms they employ. However, determining whether a country is trend-
ing toward rational sorting may provide helpful insights about how countries 
can achieve that particular component of efficiency, regardless of where they 
started.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section I identifies seven countries
that have experienced significant consumer insolvency developments over 
the last two decades and uses these developments to suggest three general 
categories for evaluating the role of professionals and institutions in shaping 
the implementation of consumer bankruptcy systems. Section II summarizes 
the key aspects of this analysis and identifies several patterns that emerge 
under the lens of historical institutionalism.
or ‘debtor-friendly’ . . . obscures the central part that other interest groups play in the development of the 
law”).
41. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, A Law-in-Action Approach to Comparative Study of Repayment Forms 
of Consumer Bankruptcy, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 331, 347–48.
42. See id. at 347.
43. See id. at 348.
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I. IDENTIFYING PATH DEPENDENT CHANGE
This Section builds on Professor Ramsay’s initial “sketch”44 by analyz-
ing recent changes in consumer insolvency systems using the tools of histor-
ical institutionalism.45 Specifically, I draw on the work of several 
international insolvency scholars to identify seven examples of systems that 
have been redesigned at various points in the last two decades in order to 
adjust to implementation issues. In most cases, the implementation by key 
professionals or institutions did not align fully with the desired outcomes 
under the law. Accordingly, the law on the books often needed to be re-
formed to adapt to the unanticipated implementation issues. As will be 
shown, some countries have been more proactive than others in responding 
to this need.
Part A discusses two examples of countries, France and the Nether-
lands, in which path-dependent reforms to avoid drifting have reduced irra-
tional sorting among debtors and have resulted in improved outcomes for 
consumers. Part B discusses three examples of countries that have experi-
enced conversion—Scotland, the United States, and Canada—leading to re-
sults that are less consumer-friendly and less rational in their sorting than 
their initial baseline. Part C discusses two examples of countries that have 
enacted pro-consumers reforms but have also experienced some degree of 
drifting, Germany and Japan.
A. Countries Where Changes Have Improved Rational Sorting and 
Consumer Outcomes
1. France
France is the first example of a country that has addressed the discon-
nect between design and implementation of its insolvency system in pro-
consumer ways.46 France’s main institutional actors are the government-cre-
ated commissions that have been tasked with a gatekeeping role in consumer 
44. See Ramsay, supra note 21, at 974. Professor Ramsay’s article included an in-depth examina-
tion of the English insolvency system, which this article will not seek to revisit or expand upon. Id. at 
965–72.
45. In particular, this project focuses on the patterns leading to the most significant consumer in-
solvency reforms of the 2000s, which was an “especially robust and dynamic” decade for developments 
in consumer insolvency. See Jason J. Kilborn, Still Chasing Chimeras but Finally Slaying Some Dragons 
in the Quest for Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 1 (2012). However, this 
Article does not purport to be a complete survey of every development, nor does it purport to present the 
most up-to-date information about any particular country.
46. See Ramsay, supra note 4, at 250 (pointing to France as the prime example of the “gradual 
liberalization” of insolvency law in Europe over the last decade); see also Kilborn, supra note 45, at 2–3
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bankruptcy and, to a lesser extent, its Cour de Cassation, which is France’s 
highest appellate court for civil legal issues. Overall, the French insolvency 
system is seen as a success in terms of its rate of use among French consum-
ers.47 Nonetheless, there have been regular amendments as the legislature 
has tried to proactively address the many gaps between policy and imple-
mentation.48
Prior to 1990, French debt relief had focused on businesses and offered 
few avenues for consumers.49 However, that changed with the enactment of 
France’s so-called loi Neiertz, which became effective in 1990.50 Under the 
loi Neiertz, the main route for consumer relief in France is a payment plan 
that is prepared and overseen by administrative commissions working under 
the auspices of the Bank of France.51
The French process was heavily utilized when it was initially imple-
mented.52 Initially, debtors could proceed straight to court.53 But France’s 
courts were overwhelmed with the number of filings, which led to significant 
delay in relief.54 In response, the legislature amended the law to have the 
commissions play more of a gatekeeping role.55 Judges retained discretion 
to determine whether to grant a discharge.56
A representative of the Bank of France does most of the work of the 
commission, including collecting information from the debtor, recommend-
ing a payment plan, and then negotiating with creditors.57 If creditors accept 
(pointing to France’s insolvency reforms in the 2000s as the lead example of a country that has dealt 
effectively with “the twin monsters of inefficiency and waste”).
47. See Jason J. Kilborn, The Hidden Life of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Danger Signs for the 
New U.S. Law from Unexpected Parallels in the Netherlands, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77, 108 (2006) 
(noting that France had twenty-seven filings per 10,000 residents in 2004, low compared to the United 
States’ fifty-five per 10,000, but high compared to the Netherlands and Belgium, which each have fewer 
than ten per 10,000).
48. See Kilborn, supra note 12, at 661.
49. See id. at 627; see also Niemi, supra note 8, at 100 (explaining that France introduced a dis-
charge for businesses in 1985 but did not add a consumer discharge until 2003).
50. See Kilborn, supra note 12, at 635.
51. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 140; see also Kilborn, supra note 12, at 637–38 (describing the 
membership of each commission, which includes a social worker, a lawyer, and a representative of the 
French central bank).
52. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 140 (noting that 90,000 applications were filed in the first ten 
months).
53. Kilborn, supra note 12, at 645.
54. Id.; see also RAMSAY, supra note 24, at 123 (explaining that the French Ministry of Justice 
sought to divert insolvencies from the “chronically underfunded” court system). Ramsay further notes 
that the courts played an early and significant role in liberalizing bankruptcy relief and pushing for greater 
uniformity. Id. at 125–28.
55. See Kilborn, supra note 12, at 645–46.
56. See Martin, supra note 1, at 42.
57. Kilborn, supra note 12, at 638.
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the plan, it is a self-executing process; if creditors resist, then the commission 
can seek court assistance.58
However, the great discretion given to the commission created lasting 
problems for the French system.59 The early plans frequently failed, due in 
part to the fact that, at eight to ten years, they were overly long.60 Many plans 
also left consumers with a “hyper-frugal budget[ ]” that left them unable to 
pay for basic living expenses.61 As a result of these unappealing prospects 
for relief, the number of filings leveled off for several years but rose again 
in the late 1990s,62 around the time when France’s economic minister 
stepped in to encourage the commissions to be less stingy with debtors.63
Legal reform occurred in 1998, when the legislature added new protec-
tions for debtor earnings.64 The 1998 reforms also added a safety valve for 
those debtors who are clearly unequipped to make use of the option of a 
negotiated payment plan: in such “extraordinary” cases, debtors could take 
advantage of a long-term deferment, at which point they become eligible for 
a partial discharge if they are still unable to make payments.65 These extraor-
dinary cases accounted for around ten percent of the debtors who apply to 
the commission, and only a small percentage of those cases are ultimately 
recommended for discharge.66
Despite these incremental changes, the system still left many consumers 
without timely and effective relief.67 In addition, the system suffered from a 
lack of uniformity because the 117 commissions across the country varied 
widely in terms of the relief they were willing to recommend for consum-
ers.68 Accordingly, in 2003, the law was amended yet again to provide more 
streamlined relief to consumers, similar to the relief that had long been avail-
able for French businesses.69 This discharge is available to those debtors who 
58. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 140.
59. See Kilborn, supra note 5, at 316.
60. See Kilborn supra note 12, at 641. 
61. See id. at 643.
62. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 140 (noting a substantial drop-off in filings between 1991 and 
1994). 
63. See Kilborn supra note 12, at 643–44. 
64. Id. at 644.
65. See id. at 650–51. The original deferment period was three years, but it was reduced to two 
years in 2004. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 26.
66. Kilborn, supra note 12, at 654.
67. Id. at 655. Professor Kilborn cites a 2001 study showing that twenty-seven percent of French 
consumers were unable to repay their debts, while only a small fraction were able to get relief.
68. See id. at 636, 664.
69. Id. at 655–56. Kilborn notes that this process is “virtually identical” to Chapter 7 in the United 
States. Id. at 656.
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the commission determines are “irremediably compromised.”70 The com-
mission then directs the matter to the court, at which point the judge, perhaps 
with help from a court-appointed trustee, verifies the debtor’s condition and 
then, if warranted, grants a broad discharge known as a “personal recov-
ery.”71
As with past changes, which proved ineffective, these new procedures 
were not immediately successful either.72 Wide disparities remained among 
the various commissions and the relief they were willing to recommend.73
However, over time, the commissions warmed to the prospect of recom-
mending larger numbers of consumer cases for the streamlined discharge 
process.74 The numbers of filers increased dramatically, prompting an addi-
tional set of streamlining measures in 2011.75
This series of changes appears to be a cautious effort at reform in the 
face of overwhelming French skepticism about lenient debt laws.76 Nonethe-
less, the end result is quite debtor friendly, as France has “moved more de-
cisively to expand and refine relief.”77 France stands out as an example of a 
country in which the political costs of discharge may have been too high 
initially.78 However, by choosing a bureaucratic system dominated by tech-
nocrats, France created a path in which the law could be gradually adjusted 
in pragmatic ways to expand relief to consumers.79
These changes have been influenced to a large degree by the presence 
of a strong institutional actor: the Bank of France.80 Initially, the Bank was 
reluctant to play a leading role in consumer insolvency, but ultimately agreed 
to be involved in the commissions under the belief that the insolvency 
measures would only be temporary.81 However, its institutional role was 
quickly cemented, which in turn impacted (and perhaps even undermined) 
the government’s ability to deliver effective relief to debtors.82
70. Id. at 658.
71. See id. at 658–60.
72. See id. at 660–61.
73. Id. at 664.
74. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 27 (noting that the percentage of recommendations increased 
from twelve percent in 2004 and 2005, to twenty percent in 2007 and 2008, and to more than thirty percent 
in 2009 and beyond).
75. See id. at 27–28.
76. See Martin, supra note 1, at 44.
77. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 28.
78. See Ramsay, supra note 21, at 972–73.
79. See id. at 973.
80. See, e.g., Kilborn, supra note 5, at 316 (describing the Bank of France as the “secret weapon”
behind the success of the French system).
81. See Ramsay, supra note 21, at 953.
82. See id. at 953–54.
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Importantly, the changes detailed above were largely reactive. After the 
legislature made the choice to place the powerful Bank of France at the cen-
ter of its system, decisions from France’s Cour de Cassation attempted to 
forge a more consistently liberal approach to relief.83 Additional legal re-
forms sought ways to scale back the discretion that the Bank-led commis-
sions were exercising, while expanding meaningful relief to more 
consumers.84 By using the commissions as gatekeepers but also constraining 
their discretion, France appears to have made great progress toward rational 
sorting. Applying the lens of historical institutionalism, we can see that the 
legislature acted repeatedly to avoid drifting and to proactively close gaps 
between design and implementation.
Because the French system is “more bureaucratic than legal in charac-
ter,”85 the system provides no real opportunity for lawyers or other private 
professionals to play a role in obtaining relief for debtor clients.86 But even 
though it is largely non-legal, France’s insolvency system shares common 
ground with its civil justice system, which is one of the cheapest and simplest 
in the world.87 In designing and reforming the French civil justice system, 
French lawmakers have consistently strived for efficiency and ease of use, 
with a particular eye to reducing the burdens faced by courts.88 Thus, it is not 
surprising that the French insolvency system has demonstrated a similar 
commitment to efficiency (by reducing irrational sorting), ease of use, and a 
bureaucracy that largely manages the process with limited need for court in-
volvement.
2. The Netherlands
The Netherlands is the second example of a country that has acted in 
largely pro-consumer ways to address distorting effects from the institutions 
tasked with implementation. The Netherlands’ main institutional actors in 
consumer insolvency have historically been its debt counselling services. 
83. See RAMSAY, supra note 24, at 126–28 (explaining how France’s Cour de Cassation, which 
focuses on legal issues, helped improve consistency).
84. See Kilborn, supra note 5, at 322. Kilborn notes that in recent years, the commissions have 
exercised their discretion in ways that are markedly more consumer-friendly, which suggests that the 
commissions have become more responsive to the political pressures they face as gatekeepers. Id. at 324.
85. See Niemi, supra note 8, at 102.
86. The one exception appears to be the lawyer on each commission who is tasked with determining 
the legal validity of creditor claims and ensuring that the commission’s court filings are legally adequate. 
See Kilborn, supra note 12, at 637.
87. See Daniel Soulez Lariviere, Overview of the Problems of French Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 737, 738–39 (1997).
88. Id. at 737.
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These municipally funded agencies have been at the center of Dutch con-
sumer life for decades, initially providing consumer banking services and 
later repurposing themselves to provide free or low-cost debt negotiation ser-
vices for consumers.89 However, we see a critical juncture in the Netherlands 
in the 1990s, which led to the addition of the court system as an institutional 
actor in 1998. The purpose of this change was to strengthen the role of debt 
counselling services in obtaining voluntary settlements.90 Following this 
change, gaps soon emerged between design and implementation, which in 
turn required significant revisions to the law. Over the long term, however, 
these reforms have helped to simplify the process and address irrational sort-
ing.91
The main path to consumer debt relief in the Netherlands was histori-
cally through credit counseling and voluntary payment plans.92 However, in 
the 1990s, concerns arose over the increase in the number of consumers seek-
ing relief coupled with a decline in the number of successful payment 
plans.93 In essence, too many consumers lacked viable debt relief. Accord-
ingly, the legislature stepped in to design a more consumer-friendly regime 
that incorporated the possibility of a discharge and fresh start.94 The result 
was 1998’s Wet schuldsanering natuurlijke personen or WSNP, which trans-
lates to “Law on Debt Rehabilitation of Natural Persons.”95
The new law had three goals: promote amicable debt settlement by cre-
ating creditor incentives to settle, reduce the overall number of bankruptcies, 
and provide a fresh start to debtors whose creditors were unwilling to settle.96
Among other objectives, the legislature hoped that strengthening debtors’ 
hand in the debt settlement process would reduce their need to resort to the 
courts, thereby facilitating a more cost-effective method of reducing over-
indebtedness.97 But the incentives created by WSNP actually had the oppo-
site effect: debt settlement rates started out very high (around forty percent) 
89. See Kilborn, supra note 47, at 88.
90. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 15.
91. See id. at 13 (noting that 2008 reforms “have begun to slay a real dragon by avoiding wasteful, 
superfluous administrative complexity”).
92. See Kilborn, supra note 47, at 87–88.
93. See id. at 91. This increase, and the resulting push for a political solution, may have been driven 
by a reform in the late 1980s that allowed creditors to collect debts from government benefits in the same 
manner that they could collect from wages. See Nadja Jungmann & Nick Huls, Debt Counselling in the 
Shadow of the Court: The Dutch Experience, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY:
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 419, 423.
94. See Kilborn, supra note 47, at 92–93.
95. Id.
96. See Jungmann & Huls, supra note 93, at 419.
97. See id. at 420.
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but dropped dramatically over the years and were hovering at around ten 
percent by 2004.98
Under the new law, consumers were still required to go through credit 
counseling to try to produce a voluntary repayment plan.99 Though plans 
may vary in their design, most debt counseling organizations adhered to a 
“Code of Conduct,” which helped to standardize the plans.100 Under the 
Code of Conduct, a plan lasts three years, treats creditors equally, leaves 
debtors with a “social minimum” after payment, and gives the debtor a dis-
charge at the end of three years.101
If this process proved unsuccessful, WSNP allowed consumers to apply 
to court for relief.102 An appointed trustee oversees the liquidation of assets 
and devises a multi-year payment plan paid through the debtor’s future in-
come.103 The payment plan is typically three years, but courts are given con-
siderable discretion in deciding whether to extend it to five years.104 After
the payment period, the debtor is eligible for a discharge unless the court 
finds a reason to deny it. In practice, the denial of a discharge is exceedingly 
rare.105
These processes were quickly standardized, thanks in large part to a 
working group of Dutch bankruptcy judges called Recofa.106 The input and 
oversight of Recofa, in turn, limited the need for legislative intervention.107
That said, in 2008, many of the procedures that had been standardized as a 
matter of practice were specifically incorporated into legislative amend-
ments.108 These changes helped further streamline an already smooth process 
for consumers.109 These amendments also brought new relief to the neediest 
consumers, allowing them to obtain a discharge after a year if the trustee 
believes that further proceedings would not be justified.110 According to Pro-
fessor Kilborn, this last development may be evidence of a “fundamental 
98. See id.
99. See Kilborn, supra note 47, at 94.
100. See Jungmann & Huls, supra note 93, at 424. The Code of Conduct was originally promulgated 
by municipal banks in 1979 and was revised in 2000 to better reflect the goals of WSNP. Id. at 431. 
Although the Code of Conduct is not mandatory, the 2000 changes created a mechanism to hold debt 
counselling services accountable. Id.
101. Id. at 424. Approximately ten percent of plan payments go to the counselling service. Id.
102. See Kilborn, supra note 47, at 95.
103. Id. at 97.
104. Id. at 102–03.
105. Id. at 104–05.
106. See id. at 99.
107. See id. at 99–101.
108. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 13–14.
109. See id. at 14.
110. See Kilborn, supra note 5, at 326–27.
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reevaluation” of the wisdom of forcing debtors to ensure a lengthy discharge 
process in order to demonstrate that they have earned their discharge.111
The new process provides a necessary safety valve for Dutch consumers 
struggling with debt.112 Although consumers initially appeared hesitant to 
use the new provisions, filings began to rise in the early 2000s.113 However,
the increased popularity of the process left consumer debt agencies strug-
gling to keep up with the pre-filing counseling requirement.114 This in turn 
introduced a delay into the system, usually totaling between three and nine 
months.115 In addition, once in the system, debtors faced considerable cred-
itor holdout problems, with creditors often taking four or five months to re-
spond to proposals.116
The end result was the opposite of what WSNP was intended to achieve: 
the total number of voluntary debt settlements decreased, even in the face of 
dramatic increases in the number of debtors applying for relief.117 Mean-
while, greater numbers of debtors were taking advantage of the court pro-
ceedings for statutory debt settlements.118
The popularity of the court option led to calls for reform due to per-
ceived abuse.119 Among other things, the courts were displeased by the inef-
ficiencies that had been created by funneling so many struggling debtors 
through time-consuming proceedings.120 In response, lawmakers added a 
carrot to encourage consumers to attempt to pursue out-of-court workouts 
with their creditors.121 The 2008 reforms also created a bit of a stick, adding 
a provision that gave judges discretion to reject the applications of debtors 
who did not appear ready to commit to the multi-year process of improving 
their financial well-being.122 Applications dropped shortly after these 
111. See id. at 327.
112. See Kilborn, supra note 47, at 108. Professor Kilborn notes, however, that the availability of 
this form of relief likely undermined the will of parties on both sides to go through the credit counseling 
process in good faith. See id. at 94–95.
113. Id. at 108; see also Jungmann & Huls, supra note 93, at 426 chart 20.2.
114. See Kilborn, supra note 47, at 94.
115. Id.
116. See Jungmann & Huls, supra note 93, at 424 (noting that creditors often took four or five 
months to respond to debtor proposals, which meant the debtor usually had to wait six to nine months for 
an accepted plan).
117. See id. at 426 chart 20.2.
118. See id. at 427 chart 20.1.
119. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 13. 
120. See Jungmann & Huls, supra note 93, at 428.
121. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 15–16. 
122. Id. at 14. For example, judges were encouraged to divert homeless debtors or those with drug 
addictions until their financial issues were better controlled. Id.
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changes.123 However, the 2008 reforms do not seem to have put a long-term 
damper on consumer debtors, with applications quickly returning to pre-re-
form levels.124 Nor do the changes appear to have negatively affected con-
sumer access to proceedings, with the rate of acceptance remaining fairly 
stable at eighty-five percent, comparable to pre-reform rates.125
The distortions apparent in the implementation of WSNP center primar-
ily on the debt counselling services. However, the causes of the distortions 
were quite diffuse and came from sources largely external to the debt coun-
selling services. One significant distortion relates to a design issue that, per-
haps inadvertently, led to greater creditor payouts in court-ordered plans. 
Specifically, WSNP imposes a small administrative surcharge on court-im-
posed settlements.126 This surcharge was intended to induce creditors to 
agree to voluntary plans by ensuring that the total payouts under voluntary 
plans would be more generous than the payouts under court-imposed settle-
ments.127 However, according to Jungmann and Huls, in setting the amount 
of the administrative charge, the legislature failed to account for the typical 
surcharges imposed by debt counselling services.128 As a result, voluntary 
agreements are only more attractive to creditors in smaller cases.129 For 
larger cases (involving monthly payments of more than 500 euros), it is more 
beneficial for creditors to opt for the administrative surcharge that accompa-
nies a court-imposed plan.130
In another blow to voluntary agreements, WSNP undermined the tools 
that debt counselling services had previously relied upon to gain creditor as-
sent. For example, under WSNP, debt counselling services lost their previous 
leverage of being able to propose payment plans longer than three years.131
This is because once debtors were empowered by the availability of a statu-
tory alternative, they were less willing to agree to concessions beyond what 




126. See Jungmann & Huls, supra note 93, at 437. Apparently, the Dutch legislature failed to take 
these payments into account when designing WSNP, as they believed that an administrative surcharge on 




130. Although Jungmann and Huls believe that the surcharge is flawed, in that it creates greater 
creditor returns for court-ordered plans involving larger monthly payouts, this could also have been an 
intentional design feature to attempt to reduce court workloads and limit court involvement to larger 
cases. See id. at 428 (noting that the courts were unhappy about the legally uninteresting workload created 
by WSNP cases as well as the unsuccessful outcomes for ordinary debtors).
131. See id.
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they could achieve in court.132 In addition, WSNP largely ended the long 
tradition of municipalities stepping in to guarantee consumer plans or fund 
them on an emergency basis.133 The availability of municipal funds to bridge 
critical gaps in payments had previously helped increase the likelihood of 
successful voluntary plans.134 However, because WSNP offered struggling 
debtors a new, alternative safety valve of a court proceeding, municipalities 
were no longer willing to play a role in bringing reluctant creditors to the 
negotiating table.135
Finally, changes to the Code of Conduct intended to better reflect the 
goals of WSNP also limited the discretion of debt counselling services. For 
example, various provisions of the Code were rephrased using mandatory 
language such as “always” and “only” and deleting open-ended language 
such as “in principle” and “roughly.”136 That said, it’s not clear that the Code 
of Conduct had an immediate impact, because debt counsellors often found 
ways to work around its provisions.137 Individual debt counselors reported 
that they deviated from the Code because of heavy workloads and their per-
sonal view that their role was to help as many debtors as possible.138 Notably, 
in their willingness to deviate from the Code, debt counselling services may 
have exacerbated the creditor holdout problems by proposing plans that 
treated frequent holdouts more favorably than other creditors.139 Over the 
long term, this seems to have undermined overall success rates, with credi-
tors reporting that they preferred court-ordered settlements because they 
trusted the courts to deliver a better result than the debt counselling ser-
vices.140
Eventually, though, the debt counselling services adjusted to their new 
role in partnership with the courts, with the success rates of voluntary plans 





136. See id. at 431–32, 432 tbl.20.1.
137. See id. at 433.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 424 n.8.
140. See id. at 429. Creditors preferences for court-ordered procedures may also have been due to 
the lower administrative surcharge in larger cases, as compared to the costs paid to debt counselors. See
id. at 437. In addition, some creditors report that they see the increased debtor burdens that arise with a 
court-imposed plan—such as administrative supervision and the public nature of the proceedings—as a 
necessary punishment for consumers who have taken on too much debt. Id. at 438.
141. Compare Kilborn, supra note 45, at 16 (noting that the rate climbed from twenty-two percent 
in 2007, to thirty-four percent in 2008, to thirty-eight percent in 2009), with Jungmann & Huls, supra
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these successes may not be due entirely to legal reform; instead, the credit 
counseling services have acted unilaterally to do a better job triaging cases 
by putting a greater focus on cases in which an out-of-court negotiation 
would offer the most realistic solution.142 However, these successes may also 
be related to the eventual acceptance of the Code of Conduct and, particu-
larly, its shift from a system of discretionary relief to a more bureaucratic 
approach.143 This approach is more efficient from a funding perspective, be-
cause the costs incurred by the debt counselling services are subsidized 
through a surcharge on plan payments of approximately ten percent.144 In
contrast, spending resources on cases in which voluntary settlement is not 
realistic was a clear example of irrational sorting.
The returned success of voluntary plans is also a welcome development 
for the courts, whose judges were not pleased that their perceived neutrality, 
as compared to the debt counselling services, was greatly increasing their 
workloads with largely uninteresting matters.145
Applying the lens of historical institutionalism, WSNP created a unique 
interplay between the two institutional actors tasked with implementation: 
the entrenched debt counselling systems and the newly added court system. 
As gaps quickly emerged between design and implementation, pressure from 
the courts resulted in repeated legislative action to prevent drifting. These 
reforms, which include both layering and course-correction, required the 
debt counselling systems to adapt and adjust to a new institutional role. Like 
the French commissions, the Netherlands’ debt counselling services were 
somewhat slow to embrace these new institutional mandates. However, over 
time, the debt counsellors have adjusted to their new roles, which in turn has 
led to fewer sorting problems and improved consumer outcomes.
B. Conversion Leading to Negative Outcomes
In this Part, I look to the examples of three countries that show evidence 
of conversion. In each case, the conversion is accompanied by new sorting 
problems, increased costs to consumers, fewer options for consumers, or 
some combination of these three negative outcomes.
note 93, at 420 (noting that the rates dropped from forty percent at the time WSNP was enacted to ten 
percent in 2004).
142. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 16.
143. See Jungmann & Huls, supra note 93, at 433.
144. See id. at 424. Typical payments range from nine percent to fourteen percent. Id. at 437.
145. See id. at 439.
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1. Scotland
One of the most striking examples of conversion in an insolvency sys-
tem is Scotland. Overindebted Scottish consumers may avail themselves of 
a process called “sequestration,” in which a trustee oversees a process that 
automatically leads to a discharge after three years.146 Alternatively, con-
sumers can arrange for repayment of individual creditors using private and 
protected trust deeds.147
Although similar forms of debt relief had been available since 1913, 
Scottish consumers rarely availed themselves of bankruptcy proceedings.148
Insufficient practitioner incentives seem to have been the main hurdle: a 
bankruptcy required a private trustee, but practitioners were reluctant to 
serve in this role unless there were promising prospects for payments—either 
in the form of estate assets or third-party guarantee.149 A 1985 redesign was 
undertaken in part to respond to the access-to-justice problems created by a 
system that depended on professional incentives.150
The Scottish government addressed the access-to-justice problems by 
providing trustee funding in cases in which the debtor would not otherwise 
be able to afford professional assistance.151 But this shift worked too well: 
practitioners quickly found a way to exploit the system, steering clients into 
sequestration and then securing their own appointment as trustee, sometimes 
with the aid of a friendly creditor.152 As a result, the number of sequestrations 
ballooned between 1985 and 1993, as did the amounts that the Scottish gov-
ernment had to pay to the now over-incentivized trustees.153 Indeed, the best 
evidence that Scottish attorneys were exploiting an ambiguity in the system 
is the fact that government payments to trustees increased by a factor of 2000 
over an eight-year period, rising from £13,000 in 1986–1987 to £26.31 mil-
lion in 1993.154
146. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 129.
147. See id.






154. See id. (citing ACCOUNTANT IN BANKR., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 
1998, at 23 tbl.(vi) (1998) (Scot.)).
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This dramatic rise in government spending provoked three reforms.
First, the government changed the trustee payment system into block pay-
ments, which basically halved the fees payable for individual cases.155 Sec-
ond, for the majority of cases, the private trustee was replaced by a 
government official known as the “Accountant in Bankruptcy.”156 Third, the 
insolvency laws were amended to reduce the ability of a trustee to bring a 
sequestration without creditor or court approval.157
These reforms resulted in a sudden drop in the number of sequestrations 
brought on behalf of Scottish consumers.158 While some might contend that 
this was merely rightsizing an out-of-control system, others believed that the 
changes prevented consumers in need from accessing debt relief.159 As was 
the case in 1985, Scottish lawmakers once again found themselves faced with 
various proposals to expand access,160 prompting an ongoing series of 
smaller reforms beginning in 2002.161
The late twentieth-century evolution of the Scottish consumer insol-
vency system reflects Scotland’s legal culture, at least to some degree. Scot-
land legal practice has long been “a cosy gentleman’s club” that shuns 
outsiders and reflects a strong sense of professional privilege.162 In addition, 
the country’s legal system has historically drawn from a wide range of influ-
ences, picking and choosing what suits it while endeavoring to maintain its 
distinctiveness.163 One practitioner proudly referred to the legal system, 
somewhat cryptically, as “inundated with pragmatic solutions and common 
law.”164 It is therefore not surprising that Scotland’s legal culture would 
adopt unique and untested elements for its insolvency law. Nor is it surpris-
ing that the Scottish insolvency system would experience conversion, with 
private practitioners exploiting ambiguities in the existing legal frame-
work.165
155. See id. at 132.
156. See id. at 131–32.
157. See id. at 132 (describing the changes resulting from the 1993 Amending Act, Bankruptcy 
(Scotland) Act 1993, ch. 6).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 132–33.
160. See id. at 133.
161. See RAMSAY, supra note 24, at 4 tbl. 1.1.
162. See Esin Örücü, The Judge and Jurist in Scotland: On the Verge of a Second Renaissance, 78 
TUL. L. REV. 89, 96 (2003).
163. See id. at 92.
164. See Sarah Meck, An Independent Scottish Legal Market Brims with Opportunities for Global 
Players, OF COUNSEL, July 3, 2000, at 1, 9.
165. See Örücü, supra note 162, at 96 (noting the tension in Scottish law between “avoid[ing] the 
danger of self-referential development” and not allowing its “status as a mixed jurisdiction [to] ‘dictate’”
the available options for legal development).
784 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 93:3
2. United States
The United States presents an interesting example of a system that 
started out quite consumer-friendly, with lawyers and courts as central insti-
tutions, but has become less consumer-friendly over time. The role of law-
yers in shaping the U.S. system has been the subject of significant scholarly 
interest. For example, Professor David Skeel has analyzed the role of lawyers 
in shaping the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.166 Seminal articles by Professor Jean 
Braucher and Professors Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay West-
brook have explored the ways in which local legal cultures have influenced 
the implementation of the 1978 Code here in the United States.167 More re-
cently, Professor Angela Littwin has offered a strong defense of the role of 
the private bar in the United States’ system.168 She points to the private bar’s 
success in obtaining discharges for their clients, particularly as compared to 
unrepresented consumers.169 Littwin argues that lawyers play a vital role in 
maintaining a functioning bankruptcy system in the United States, especially 
in the face of the overall societal trend toward cutbacks to social welfare 
programs.170
The changes in the United States’ consumer insolvency system have 
been the subject of much study, but the discussion below will only address 
the key points that are most significant to a historical institutionalism analy-
sis.
With the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, the United States made the 
groundbreaking decision to provide a fairly straightforward discharge option 
to consumers under chapter 7. Chapter 7 allowed consumers a relatively 
quick and low-cost discharge in exchange for the liquidation of their assets, 
which in turn was subject to exemptions that were, in many cases, quite gen-
erous. As an alternative to relief under chapter 7, consumers were also free 
to choose the option of a long-term payment plan under chapter 13, followed 
by a discharge without the need for liquidation of assets. The dual system 
166. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
146–51 (2001) (discussing the bankruptcy bar’s self-interested advocacy for scope-expanding provisions 
in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code).
167. See generally Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures,
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501 (1993); Teresa Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty 
Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801 (1994).
168. See Littwin, supra note 11, at 1935 (noting that lawyers play a protective role in the system).
169. See id. at 1971–72 (finding that 17.6 percent of debtors who file for chapter 7 without repre-
sentation have their cases dismissed, as compared to 1.9 percent of debtors who have attorneys).
170. See id. at 2009–22.
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included several “carrots” that would encourage consumers to repay more 
debt over a longer term using chapter 13.171
Chapter 7 proved quite popular.172 Due in part to the high rates of use, 
and concerns of abuse, Congress scaled back consumer options in 2005, with 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act. The carrots 
that were intended to encourage consumers to file for chapter 13 were largely 
eliminated and instead replaced with sticks to force consumers into chapter 
13: most notably, the “Means Test,” which required every filer to submit to 
a “time- and resource-intensive” process that ostensibly prevents higher in-
come consumers from pursuing relief under chapter 7.173
Lawyers played a key role in the design of the 1978 system.174 In par-
ticular, lawyers (along with the federal judiciary) opposed proposals to create 
an administrative system that would provide easy relief for consumers with 
no assets.175 Instead, they favored a judicial model, which in turn cemented 
their institutional role in the implementation of the system.
In stark contrast to their key role in 1978, lawyers were largely excluded 
from the design of the 2005 amendments.176 These amendments dampened 
filing rates, because chapter 7 became less accessible and chapter 13 became 
less desirable.177 In addition, the 2005 changes shifted the U.S. system ever 
171. See RAMSAY, supra note 24, at 49 (noting in particular the chapter 13 debtor’s ability to change 
payment terms to secured creditors (known as “cramdown”) and to discharge several categories of debts 
not dischargeable in chapter 7 (known as the “super discharge”)).
172. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 3 (positing that reform efforts were spurred in part by the fact 
that in 1996, “annual bankruptcy filings had exceeded the psychologically important one million mark”).
173. See generally id. at 6–9 (explaining how the Means Test works).
174. See SKEEL, supra note 166, at 150 (noting “the bankruptcy bar’s remarkable success in expand-
ing the scope of U.S. bankruptcy laws” through the enactment of the 1978 Code); Littwin, supra note 11,
at 1984–85.
175. See Ramsay, supra note 4, at 271.
176. As Professor Skeel explains it, the credit industry sought to preempt pro-consumer reform ef-
forts by submitting their own legislation. See SKEEL, supra note 166, at 187–88. Although the credit 
industry’s proposals were embraced by the Republican-dominated Congress, id. at 199, President Clinton
ultimately refused to sign the bill into law. Id. at 210. The 2005 amendments that were ultimately signed 
into law by President George W. Bush were written by credit card issuer MBNA and passed with little 
input from the professionals who would be tasked with implementing them. See Kilborn, supra note 45,
at 4; see also Ramsay, supra note 4, at 264 (noting that the fact that BAPCPA was enacted over the 
objection of many bankruptcy professionals “indicates the limits of professional influence over legislation 
(if not over its implementation)”).
177. Filings dropped initially but returned to pre-BAPCPA levels of well over one million filings 
within five years. See Kilborn, supra note 45, at 4. However, this surge also coincided with the foreclosure 
crisis, when many homeowners were using bankruptcy protections to try to save their homes. Levels have 
dropped off significantly in recent years, with approximately 750,000 consumer filings in 2016. See 2016
Report of Statistics Required by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/bapcpa-report-2016 [perma.cc/63ER-RNEW].
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so slightly away from a broadly discretionary model and towards a more bu-
reaucratic model, with the introduction of more bright line rules such as the
Means Test.178
These changes were decidedly not pro-consumer.179 Clear evidence of 
this comes from the increased costs to file bankruptcy, which puts bank-
ruptcy out of reach for many low-income families.180 Although consumers 
can attempt to reduce costs by filing without legal representation, this dra-
matically reduces the odds of receiving a discharge.181 This presents a di-
lemma for consumers who want representation but cannot afford the upfront 
fees necessary to file for bankruptcy.
One imperfect solution to this dilemma is to file a so-called “fee-only” 
chapter 13, a term used to describe a chapter 13 plan in which the majority 
of plan payments go toward attorney fees.182 A recent article highlights the 
rise of this controversial practice.183 Specifically, Professors Foohey, Law-
less, Porter, and Thorne demonstrate that the number of fee-only chapter 13 
filings has increased significantly since 2007, while the number of consum-
ers filing chapter 7 and traditional chapter 13 have declined.184 They trace 
these developments to a number of factors, including the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lamie v. United States Trustee.185 In Lamie, the Supreme 
Court concluded that only an attorney who is under the supervision of a trus-
tee can be paid with funds from the bankruptcy estate.186 Thus, consumer 
attorneys found themselves with no viable way to ensure payment from a 
chapter 7 client who needed to file for bankruptcy quickly but lacked the 
funds to pay attorney fees up front.187
178. See generally Kilborn, supra note 45, at 6–9.
179. See, e.g., id. at 5 (arguing that BAPCPA “created a mass of expensive, burdensome, and dis-
tracting challenges for debtors, their lawyers, trustees, and the courts”).
180. See Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2007, at
175, 187 (noting increased out of pockets costs for debtors post-BAPCPA); see also Mann, supra note 3,
at 242 (“[I]t is surprising that the US has not yet come to grips with the reality of the lower-middle-class 
bankrupt who has no substantial income or assets.”).
181. See Littwin, supra note 11, at 1971–72 (noting that pro se debtors have close to nine times the 
dismissal rate as debtors with attorney representation).
182. See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, “No Money 
Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1104 (2017).
183. See Paul Kiel with Hannah Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System Is Failing Black Americans,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://features.propublica.org/bankruptcy-inequality/bankruptcy-failing-
black-americans-debt-chapter-13/ [https://perma.cc/6FG3-2GH4].
184. Foohey et al., supra note 182, at 1075 tbl.1.
185. 540 U.S. 526, 529 (2004).
186. Id.
187. Foohey et al., supra note 182, at 1066–68. While there is no ethical way to ensure payment 
under these circumstances, Foohey et al. note that some attorneys will accept post-dated checks, which 
arguably violates either the automatic stay or the discharge injunction. Id. at 1067–68.
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Accordingly, attorneys have increasingly turned to chapter 13 as a way 
of ensuring payment from clients and facilitating their access to the protec-
tions of bankruptcy court. Notably, the costs and fees a consumer must pay 
over the course of a chapter 13 are, on average, almost $2000 higher than the 
costs and fees of a chapter 7.188
Professors Foohey et al. argue that this trend toward fee-only chapter 
13 is evidence that practitioner incentives are affecting the use and accessi-
bility of chapter 7. Their argument is bolstered by findings from a separate 
consumer study conducted by Lois Lupica, which showed that bankruptcy 
practitioners were losing money on chapter 7 practices.189 They propose both 
legislative and judicial fixes in order to ensure that consumers have equal 
access to bankruptcy and do not have their options limited by attorney incen-
tives.190
Assuming that the critiques of fee-only chapter 13s are correct,191 the
increased use of this mechanism may represent an example of conversion, 
with institutional actors (here, private attorneys) exploiting ambiguities in 
the system by steering clients toward chapter 13 in order to generate greater 
fee revenues from clients who would be better served by chapter 7. Moreo-
ver, attorneys who indiscriminately steer clients toward chapter 13 rather 
than chapter 7 contribute to irrational sorting problems, in that courts are 
forced to spend increased time confirming or modifying chapter 13 plans for 
debtors who would be better served by a quick and simple chapter 7 dis-
charge. It remains to be seen how Congress and the courts will respond to 
the current calls for reform. A lack of response may be seen as an example 
of drifting, which leads to the follow up question of whether the drifting is 
inadvertent or intentional. Intentional drifting could indicate that the politi-
cally difficult goal of further reducing access to a chapter 7 discharge is being 
achieved through institutional means.192
188. Id. at 1058 (finding average fees of $1229 for chapter 7 and $3217 for chapter 13).
189. Id. (citing Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 17, 30, 69 (2012)).
190. Id. at 1102–05.
191. Courts have had a mixed reaction to fee-only chapter 13. Compare Berliner v. Pappalardo (In
re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The dangers of such plans are manifest, and a debtor who 
submits such a plan carries a heavy burden of demonstrating special circumstances that justify its sub-
mission.”), with In re Doucet, No. 15-21531, 2016 WL 2603072, at *8 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 3, 2016) 
(“Courts fear attorneys choose Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7 to secure higher fees and win the client 
when they cannot otherwise afford Chapter 7’s upfront costs. This view is misplaced . . . .”). There are 
certainly instances in which chapter 13 is the only viable option for a client who needs immediate relief 
and cannot afford the up-front fees of chapter 7.
192. The theory of intentional drift is bolstered by the critique that the introduction of the Means 
Test in 2005 was more symbolic than meaningful. See SKEEL, supra note 166, at 205 (questioning why 
the credit industry was “so anxious to enact a provision with so little real bite”). The fact that the Code is 
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The critiques of the U.S. insolvency system parallel the problems that 
have been identified in our civil litigation system. In particular, high attorney 
fees are a hallmark of our civil system.193 High fees relate largely to lawyers’ 
monopoly power as well as the barriers to entering the profession.194 The 
effect of these barriers is likely magnified for debtors in light of the highly 
technical nature of bankruptcy law.195
3. Canada
A third example of conversion and drifting comes from the Canadian 
experience, where consumer insolvency law underwent repeated adjust-
ments to address practitioner incentives. In Canada, debtors have the option 
of pursuing a straightforward bankruptcy with a discharge or making a con-
sumer proposal, which requires the debtor to make more payments to credi-
tors.196
There are two key actors in Canadian consumer bankruptcies: the Of-
fice of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB), which oversees administra-
tion,197 and the trustee, who is a private practitioner with an accounting 
background.198 Canadian trustees have a monopoly on consumer debt pro-
ceedings, even more so than lawyers in the United States, because a private 
trustee is essential to the consumer process in Canada.199 Importantly, trus-
tees were not always this powerful: Canada used to offer a popular, publicly 
administered option in the 1970s.200 However, the public option was abol-
ished in 1979 after lobbying from the trustee industry.201
From there, the trustee’s role was centralized and expanded in 1991.202
In addition to their longstanding duty to report on the debtor’s reasons for 
filing,203 trustees were newly charged with determining the debtor’s “surplus 
income,” meaning the amount available to be paid to creditors.204 This 
already forcing high-income debtors into chapter 13 makes it a bit harder to highlight the inequity that 
arises from the structural incentives facing low-income debtors.
193. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice 
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 954 (2000).
194. Id. at 982–84.
195. See Littwin, supra note 11, at 1938.
196. See Ramsay, supra note 40, at 385–86.
197. See id. at 393–94.
198. See id. at 387.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 388.
201. See id.
202. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 28–30.
203. See id. at 38–39.
204. See id. at 29–30.
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amount is typically fifty to seventy-five percent of the amount remaining 
after payment of the debtor’s basic living expenses.205 Trustees were also 
tasked with monitoring the debtor’s compliance in order to make a recom-
mendation on whether remaining debt should be discharged, or whether the 
debtor is capable of making continued payments.206
One notable flaw in the design of this system is that trustees are private 
practitioners who are hired by the debtor.207 Practitioners advertise heavily 
to attract this business, which in turn creates a risk of a conflict of interest.208
In particular, Professor Ziegel expressed concern that debtors might feel mis-
led by hiring a professional who will later make recommendations as a trus-
tee that complicate the path to discharge. Alternatively, perhaps the close 
relationship between debtor and trustee might interfere with the trustee’s rec-
ommendations regarding discharge.209 Although Ziegel admits there is “no 
hard evidence” of an actual conflict,210 he notes that trustees reported feeling 
pressure from debtors. This pressure may have affected performance, be-
cause recommendations for continued payments in lieu of discharge were 
quite rare.211
On the other hand, there is hard evidence of other instances of conver-
sion that results in increased costs for consumers as well as irrational sorting 
among debtors. For example, the majority of disbursements go to pay the 
trustee, rather than creditors.212 In addition, these fees come at the expense 
of debtors, who end up paying more than they otherwise need to in order to 
compensate their trustees.213 Another distortion that has been identified is 
that married debtors do not appear to be taking advantage of the process for 
filing joint petitions, a reform that was introduced in 1992 to create cost sav-
ings for consumers.214 This failure to realize the benefits of reform may be 
due to trustees’ incentives to undercut the law on the books.215 Moreover, the 
OSB appears to have practically partnered with the trustees to create drifting 
205. See id.
206. See id. at 37.
207. See id. at 155.
208. See id.; Ramsay, supra note 40, at 389 (noting that the competition for business may lead to 
“‘unfair competition’ from . . . those willing to provide a pro-debtor interpretation of legislation”).
209. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 155–56.
210. See id. at 155.
211. See id. at 37 (noting that trustees recommended extended payments in approximately seven 
percent of cases).
212. See Braucher, supra note 41, at 339–40 (noting that a 2001 study showed that trustees received 
four times the disbursements that creditors received).
213. See id. at 339 (noting that a 2005 study showed that forty-five percent of debtors with surplus 
income liability paid additional amounts to their trustee, averaging $1800 over a nine-month period).
214. See Ramsay, supra note 40, at 389–90.
215. See id. at 389.
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in the system, by raising the fees that trustees could charge for consumer 
proposals.216 As a result, trustees may be hesitant to recommend the less lu-
crative option of bankruptcy, which in turn has produced the intended result 
of reducing the numbers of consumers filing for bankruptcy.217 This may 
exacerbate sorting problems and lead to suboptimal outcomes for consum-
ers.218
C. Countries that Have Been Slower to Address Drifting
The third set of examples are systems in which inadequate practitioner 
incentives and an absence of strong institutional change agents creates dis-
tortions that have not been effectively addressed by lawmakers, which has 
led to drifting.
1. Germany
The first example of an insolvency system in which inadequate incen-
tives may be impeding policy objectives comes from Germany. Unlike Scot-
land, which created too much practitioner interest in sequestrations,219 the
German government’s efforts to extend debt relief to consumers was 
thwarted by the insufficient incentives for practitioners to take on bankruptcy 
cases.220 German insolvency law traditionally did not distinguish between 
business and consumer bankruptcy,221 and no court-ordered discharge was 
available to either type of debtor.222 The main mechanism for debt relief was 
a procedure for court-ordered settlement that was based on negotiations with 
creditors.223
However, while the system was adequate for businesses, its provisions 
were not favorable to consumers.224 Among other problems, a debtor could 
only use the court-ordered liquidation process if there were enough assets 
available to cover the costs of the proceeding.225 Because these costs were 
216. See id. at 410.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 411.
219. See supra Section I.B.1.
220. See generally ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 140–43.
221. See Jason J. Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief: Revolution-
ary Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
257, 262 (2004).
222. See id. at 264.
223. See id. at 262–63 (describing Germany’s two pre-1999 alternatives: Konkursordnung, which 
had a liquidation provision, and Vergleichsordnung, which was more of a restructuring provision).
224. Id. at 262.
225. See id. at 263.
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significant, most debtors who entered these proceedings found their cases 
dismissed for insufficient assets.226
After reunification, German lawmakers began to focus on reforming the 
country’s insolvency laws, with an eye towards creating a discharge mecha-
nism for businesses.227 However, Germany was also facing a rising con-
sumer debt crisis in the 1980s and 1990s.228 Under pressure from consumer 
groups and the Social Democratic party, lawmakers added provisions that 
were intended to expand relief to consumers.229
The new law, Insolvenzordung, was enacted in 1994 but became effec-
tive in 1999.230 It provided for a debt adjustment procedure in which con-
sumers would negotiate with creditors for a repayment plan, which would be 
binding on unsecured creditors based on the approval of half the creditors (in 
both number and value).231 It also provided for a bankruptcy proceeding in 
which consumers committed to a seven year payment plan, followed by a 
discharge of remaining debt if they satisfied all of the statutory require-
ments.232
The law quickly proved ineffective, with only thirteen percent of appli-
cations leading to approved payment plans.233 Among other things, the pro-
cedures were quite complex, and the prospect of low fees made attorneys 
reluctant to take on cases.234 The 1994 Insolvenzordnung was amended less 
than two years after taking effect in an effort to better incentivize consumer 
filings.235 Most of the reforms were substantive, including a reduction in the 
commitment period (a decrease from seven years, running from the date of 
approval, to six years, running from the filing date).236 The amendments also 
helped expand access to lower-income debtors by reducing court fees and
allowing some debtors the option of postponing payment until after dis-
charge.237 The Insolvenzordnung also has a unique feature of “motivation 
rebates,” which allows debtors to retain more of their income after they have 
226. Id.
227. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 140.
228. See Kilborn, supra note 221, at 260–61.
229. See ZIEGEL, supra note 2, at 140.
230. See id. at 140–41.
231. See id. at 141 (describing the procedures under article 304 of the 1994 Insolvenzordnung).
232. See id. (describing article 286 of the 1994 Insolvenzordnung).
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 142.
236. See id.
237. See id.; see also Wolfram Backert et al., Bankruptcy in Germany: Filing Rates and the People 
Behind the Numbers, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 273, 274.
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made four years of payments.238 The amendments that took effect in 2002 
expanded the amount of income that consumer debtors are allowed to retain 
through proceedings, subject to periodic review for inflation.239 Although the 
amounts that consumers retain are not large, they created “a much more solid 
foundation for a modest lifestyle.”240 Consumer filings increased exponen-
tially after these amendments,241 with rates rising steadily for several years, 
until dropping for the first time in 2008.242
Despite these efforts to make consumer insolvency proceedings more 
debtor-friendly, it is still not clear that Germany has created the right incen-
tives to optimally address its consumer debt problem.243 Lawyers are unwill-
ing to take on consumer cases because the pay is inadequate to compensate 
for the amount of work involved in navigating the complicated proce-
dures.244 Without private attorneys, the task of assisting overindebted con-
sumers with bankruptcy falls entirely to government-funded consumer debt 
agencies. Professor Kilborn noted “serious bottlenecks in the system,” as 
there were not sufficient numbers of professionals to meet the demands.245
The centers are not funded at adequate levels.246 Waiting periods can be as 
long as a year, and some centers even had to turn away debtors by the mid-
2000s because even their waiting lists became unmanageable.247 Moreover, 
in many federal states, these agencies only get paid based on the number of 
insolvency proceedings they initiate, which may further distort the rate of 
238. Kilborn, supra note 221, at 283–84. Professor Kilborn explains that these rebates were proposed 
as an alternative to reducing the length of the payment period to four years, as proposed by the Social 
Democrats. Id. at 283. Instead, after completing the fourth year of payment, consumers receive a ten 
percent rebate of their annual income assigned to creditors. Id. at 284. The rebate increases to fifteen 
percent in year five and to twenty percent in year six. Id. at 283–84.
239. Id. at 285–86.
240. Id. at 286. According to Professor Kilborn, creditors receive surprisingly little from debtors 
during the six-year waiting period. Id. at 291. This in turn suggests that the waiting period is intended less 
as a mechanism to improve creditor recovery and more as “a psychological device to press upon the 
debtor the notion of shouldering the burden of unpaid debts in order to earn the privilege of a discharge.”
Id. As further support for the paternalistic nature of the system, Professor Kilborn explains that the Ger-
man word for the six-year payment period (Wohlverhaltensperiode) translates as “good behavior period,”
which in turn suggests that German insolvency law is intended to promote a “resocialization” of consumer 
debtors. Id. at 296.
241. See Backert et al., supra note 237, at 274.
242. See Michael Knobloch, Unemployment and Overindebtedness in Germany, in CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 127, 142 (Wolfram Backert et al. eds., 2013).
243. See id. at 139–40.
244. See Kilborn, supra note 221, at 272–73.
245. See id. at 273–74.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 274.
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filing.248 As of 2009, eight out of ten consumers who initiate adjustment pro-
ceedings end up filing for bankruptcy.249
Studies of the German system show that consumers, on average, post-
pone seeking assistance until they are well beyond the point of recovery.250
This suggests that there are still impediments in the design of the system, in 
that the law is relatively harsh on consumers.251 For example, the six-year 
waiting period for a discharge is seen by consumer advocacy groups as 
overly long, particularly when compared to the shorter periods selected by 
some other European countries.252 In addition, the process for obtaining a 
discharge is seen as overly complex, with one commentator describing it as 
“a complicated four-step obstacle course.”253 The one-size-fits-all process 
suggests that Germany engages in irrational sorting, by forcing all consumers 
to jump through each hoop in order to earn a discharge, with no correspond-
ing benefit to creditors in most cases.
Although various reform proposals have been brought forward since 
2001, political change has been slow to materialize.254 This lack of legal 
change appears to be a potent example of drifting. This drifting may stem 
from the fact that, unlike most of the other countries discussed, Germany 
lacks a powerful institutional force in its insolvency systems. The courts do 
not appear to be playing a prominent role in reform efforts, which may reflect
the relatively limited degree of public confidence that Germans have in their 
civil court system.255 Moreover, the fact that German lawyers do not have 
incentives to play a prominent role in the system leaves the consumer insol-
vency system without a powerful institutional force for change, which may 
further contribute to drifting.
248. See Knobloch, supra note 242, at 139–40.
249. See id. at 140.
250. See id.; see also Backert et al., supra note 237, at 281 (finding that the average debtor is lower-
income and struggles with employment).
251. See Backert et al., supra note 237, at 288 (noting that many of the hurdles in German law 
unnecessarily burden low income consumers without creating any benefits for creditors).
252. See Kilborn, supra note 221, at 284; see also Kilborn, supra note 45, at 24 (“[T]he great bulk 
of cases impose an extended period of pain on debtors and an uncompensated administrative burden on 
the [federal government] with no obvious corresponding benefit . . . .”).
253. Kilborn, supra note 221, at 272.
254. See Kilborn, supra note 5, at 328 (noting in 2007 that long-pending studies might finally result 
in reforms); Kilborn, supra note 45, at 22 (as of 2012, “a decade has passed since Germany last reformed 
its consumer insolvency law[s]”).
255. See Peter Gottwald, Civil Procedure Reform in Germany, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 759 (1997) 
(noting that Germany has an unusually high rate of appeals compared to other European countries, and 
this lack of confidence may reflect the weak qualifications and experience of its judges).
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2. Japan
Japanese insolvency law, like many other areas of Japanese law, has 
undergone gradual and incremental reforms during the last few decades.256
Japan offers two forms of relief to consumer debtors: a discharge under bank-
ruptcy law as well as a civil rehabilitation proceeding.257 Consumers have 
great flexibility to choose either alternative.258 Rehabilitation proceedings 
are much more complicated and were largely designed for businesses rather 
than consumers.259 Moreover, proceedings are quite lengthy, lasting ten 
years.260 At that point, Japanese consumers may apply for a discharge on 
terms that are fairly similar to the United States.261 Specifically, the judge 
must find that the debtor is honest and unable to repay their debt.262 The sheer 
cost of these proceedings puts them out of reach for most consumers.263
These proceedings were streamlined in 2000 to allow certain consumer debt-
ors to obtain a discharge in three years.264 Despite these changes, the rate of 
usage of rehabilitation proceedings has remained very low.265
In contrast, Japan’s bankruptcy option is a straightforward liquidation 
proceeding: the debtor gives up non-exempt assets, which are then liquidated 
for pro rata distribution to creditors.266 If the debtor does not have any non-
exempt assets to liquidate, the debtor is eligible for “simultaneous termina-
tion,” which means that the discharge is granted immediately without the 
need to appoint a trustee.267 However, the court may exercise its discretion 
to appoint a trustee who conducts a limited investigation into whether the 
256. See Souichirou Kozuka & Luke Nottage, The Myth of the Cautious Consumer: Law, Culture, 
Economics and Politics in the Rise and Partial Fall of Unsecured Lending in Japan, in CONSUMER 
CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at
199, 209.
257. Junichi Matsushita, Japan’s Personal Insolvency Law, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 765, 765 (2007). The 
Bankruptcy Law (Hasan Ho) was amended in 2004 and became effective in 2005, while the rehabilitation 
provisions (Minji Saisei Ho) were enacted in 1999 and became effective in 2000. Id. at 766.
258. See id. at 769–70 (explaining that the government rejected initial proposals to require rehabili-
tation if a debtor had significant disposable income or to condition discharge on a debtor’s payment of 
the amount the debtor would be expected to pay under a rehabilitation plan).
259. See id. at 768.
260. See Martin, supra note 1, at 59.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 59 n.385.
263. See Matsushita, supra note 257, at 768.
264. See id. The streamlined procedures are available to debtors with regular income who owe less 
than 50 million yen. Id. (citing MINJI SAISEI HO [Civil Rehabilitation Law] 1999 (Japan)).
265. See id. at 769 (noting that there were just over 8000 streamlined rehabilitation cases filed in 
2003 and 2004).
266. See id. at 766.
267. See id. at 767–68.
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debtor is concealing assets prior to granting a discharge.268 As of 2005, close 
to ninety percent of cases were no asset cases, and trustees were appointed 
and then terminated in seven percent of these cases.269
Japan’s bankruptcy law underwent major amendments in 2005, most 
significantly to dramatically increase the consumer exemption amounts.270
Although the dollar ceiling for exempt assets is still quite low (the equivalent 
of less than $10,000 dollars at the time of enactment), it reflects a more than 
four-fold increase over the meager pre-2005 limits, which were seen as in-
adequate to protect debtors and their dependents.271 The 2005 amendments 
also reduced the time period for a successive discharge from ten years to 
seven years, and further authorized courts to waive the waiting period alto-
gether at their discretion.272 As amended, the bankruptcy option is far more 
popular among consumers than the rehabilitation option.273
Perhaps due in part to these reforms, Japan experienced record numbers 
of consumer bankruptcies in the latter half of the 2000s.274 Nonetheless, 
overall the number of consumers filing for bankruptcy is low relative to 
countries like the United States.275 This appears largely due to the great 
stigma attached to bankruptcy in Japan.276 The strictly controlled consumer 
insolvency process appears to both reflect and perpetuate that stigma.277
Only insolvent consumers are permitted to file a bankruptcy case, meaning 
that the consumer must unable to pay debts as they become due.278 Likewise,
the exemptions available to consumers are notoriously skimpy.279
268. See id. at 768.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 766.
271. See id. at 766 nn.8–9.
272. See id. at 767. In exercising its discretion, the court is instructed to consider the reasons for the 
debtor’s financial failure. Id. (citing HASAN HO [Bankruptcy Law] 2004 (Japan)).
273. See id. at 766 (noting that there are almost ten times as many cases filed under the new bank-
ruptcy law in 2005 as there were rehabilitations).
274. See Kozuka & Nottage, supra note 256, at 200 (noting that these record filings were accompa-
nied by large numbers of debt-related suicides, with close to twenty percent of unsecured borrowers con-
sidered “overindebted” as of 2006); see also Ramsay, supra note 4, at 269 (Japan’s reforms “made 
insolvency more accessible, and Japan now has a rate higher than England and Wales”).
275. See Martin, supra note 1, at 59 (describing personal bankruptcy as “rare,” with only 0.7 filings 
per 1000 citizens, as compared to 5.2 per thousand in the United States as of 2000).
276. See id. at 54 (noting the culture of shame surrounding bankruptcy, that views debt as a personal 
failure).
277. See Kozuka & Nottage, supra note 256, at 210 (describing Japan’s recent consumer reforms as 
part of “a tradition of paternalistic protection of the weaker party” that has now been expanded more 
generally to consumers as a class).
278. See Martin, supra note 1, at 59.
279. See id. at 59–60 (noting that a common expression applied to debtors translates as “one rice 
bowl and one pair of chopsticks”).
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That said, the relatively low rate of filing appears to have benefitted 
those consumers who do decide that they need the relief of a discharge, be-
cause the system has fewer gatekeeping requirements.280 The default is that 
all debtors who file for bankruptcy will receive a discharge, unless the court 
exercises its discretion to deny a discharge based on a finding of abuse.281 In
choosing discharge as the default, the 2005 amendments expressly rejected 
proposals to require higher income debtors to choose rehabilitation, or to re-
quire debtors who chose bankruptcy proceedings to pay an amount equiva-
lent to what they would pay in rehabilitation before they could obtain the 
discharge.282 In conjunction with the Japanese stigma that deters debtors 
from filing bankruptcy in the first instance, the legislative decision to impose 
efficient default rules reduces the risk of irrational sorting and results in a 
more cost-effective system.283
Overall, the Japanese bankruptcy system tends to mirror the civil litiga-
tion system. As is reflected in the Japanese word for lawyer—bengoshi,
which translates as “mediator”—lawyers are expected to serve first and fore-
most as problem solvers.284 Courts are only used if absolutely necessary, and 
it is viewed as “embarrassing and shameful” to be unable to work problems 
out without the need for court intervention.285 Just as civil litigants have in-
centives to try to negotiate solutions rather than resort to courts, Japanese 
consumers also have incentives to try to negotiate their way to lower debt
loads.286
Although perhaps not ideal from the perspective of consumers in need 
of relief, the Japanese system is one that obviously reflects the nation’s cul-
tural values. And, as with Germany, neither the lawyers nor courts appear to 
be strong proponents of change. Thus, the Japanese insolvency system ap-
pears to be another example of drifting.
280. See Matsushita, supra note 257, at 770.
281. See id. at 771 (noting that there are no clear criteria for determining abuse which means the 
determination is likely to vary significantly from one judge to the next).
282. See id. at 770.
283. See id.
284. See Martin, supra note 1, at 55–56.
285. See id. at 53.
286. See Kozuka & Nottage, supra note 256, at 201–02 (explaining that a unique feature of Japanese 
law regarding interest rates creates a “grey zone” in which a particularly high interest rate may or may 
not be lawful, and that this grey zone creates many opportunities for lawyers to renegotiate their clients’
debt burdens).
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II. CAPTURING THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ACTORS AS CHANGE AGENTS
This Section discusses some of the main takeaways from the compara-
tive study of the seven consumer insolvency systems discussed in Section I.
Part A presents a summary table, and Part B identifies five potential impli-
cations that arise from this initial sketch.
A. Distilling the Insights Yielded by Historical Institutionalism
This table provides a broad (and admittedly reductive) overview of the 
main takeaways from Section I. An explanation of each category follows.






































































The “Key Actors” column includes the main institutional actors who 
are tasked with implementing the consumer bankruptcy laws. Although 
courts play a discernible role in most of these systems, courts are only iden-
tified as a key actor if they have played a prominent role in designing the 
system or shaping its implementation.
The “Power as Change Agents” column is intended to approximate the 
degree to which the key actors have contributed to change in consumer in-
solvency systems. Importantly, “change” includes both law on the books and 
law in action. Thus, for example, an actor like the counselling services in the 
Netherlands may have little power to change the law on the books, but as the 
primary actor involved in implementation, these counseling services have a 
strong law-in-action role. The label assigned is intended to be an aggregate 
rating.
“Type of Change” includes actual reforms as well as concepts from his-
torical institutionalism that capture the ways in which the law in action may 
differ from the law on the books.
The column labeled “Sorting Problems” addresses the degree to which 
recent changes have improved or worsened initial sorting problems in the 
insolvency system. Importantly, this column is relative to the country’s orig-
inal baseline and does not reflect a comparison between countries.
Finally, “Trend” addresses whether the changes in the law on the books 
and the law in action have been pro-consumer or anti-consumer. “Pro-con-
sumer” applies when a country has taken action to expand relief to consum-
ers since 2000. “Anti-consumer” is obviously a loaded term, but it applies 
when a country has acted to limit consumer options (e.g., the United States 
and Scotland) or has failed to act in the face of possible conversion that in-
creases the costs consumers must pay for access to debt relief (e.g., the 
United States and Canada). As with the previous column, the “Trend” re-
flects changes from a country’s pre-2000 baseline and is not intended as a 
direct comparison among countries.
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B. Identifying Patterns
Although this is just a brief sketch, five interesting points emerge from 
this table, which may merit further consideration and study. First, we only 
see instances of conversion in countries where the change agents have pri-
vate economic incentives. In fact, Japan is the only country where private 
professionals are key actors but have not shown indications of conversion. 
This is likely due to the unique nature of the Japanese legal system, as de-
scribed in Section I.C.2.
Second, conversion is a net negative, both from a consumer perspective 
and a sorting perspective. In each of the cases in which conversion is ob-
served, the conversion increases irrational sorting, increases the costs to con-
sumers, or both. Notably, when conversion is addressed by reform, as it was 
in Scotland, the result may still be a net negative for consumers. For exam-
ple, the legislature may address the perceived abuse by eliminating consumer 
options that are susceptible to abuse, or by creating obstacles to using these 
options, which in turn may impose cost or delay on consumers. Importantly, 
this study did not reveal any instances of countries that have taken steps to 
impose restrictions on key actors. Instead, the repercussions of reforms to 
address conversion fall almost entirely on consumers.
Third, strong pro-consumer trends and improved sorting are most often 
observed in countries without private actors, but with influential change 
agents. France centered its system around a powerful institutional change 
agent in the Bank of France, while the Netherlands added the courts as an 
influential change agent. In both cases, the resulting trends were pro-con-
sumer as well as more efficient in the sense that the resulting changes led to 
more rational sorting over time.
Fourth, drifting is most likely to occur in countries with relatively weak 
key actors. Thus, in both Germany and Japan, we see weak actors coupled 
with some evidence of drifting. This is consistent with the predictions of 
public choice theory, which tells us that political change is usually driven by 
powerful and concentrated institutional actors.287
Fifth, drifting is not necessarily a negative from the standpoint of con-
sumers or from the standpoint of rational sorting. Japan and Germany both 
show mixed results from systems that have largely been allowed to drift. This 
287. See, e.g., Ramsay, supra note 40, at 382 (introducing concepts of interest group analysis and 
public choice theory to insolvency systems and explaining that particular outcomes are often a “side effect 
of the interests of more powerful players”).
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is consistent with the possibility that drifting (llike conversion) may be in-
tentional design feature that allow the institutional actors to facilitate out-
comes that could not be achieved directly through political change.
CONCLUSION
It is well established that consumer bankruptcy systems are social tools 
that reflect a country’s value system.288 But once designed, the system is then 
entrusted to professionals and institutions for implementation. As consumer 
insolvency law evolves around the world, the varied roles of those profes-
sionals and institutions have become clearer and yield a broader understand-
ing of why gaps emerge between design and implementation, and how those 
gaps can best be addressed. Moreover, the ways in which various countries 
respond to those gaps are often as important as the initial design choices, if 
not more so. By taking these additional questions into account, comparative 
scholars can move toward deeper understandings of insolvency law in action, 
alongside the already rich body of work addressing the law on the books.
288. See Martin, supra note 1, at 5.
